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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ON QUALITY

PHILOSOPHY has long been engaged in the attempt to define and explain those things which are clear and distinct. Before Descartes called attention to the criteria of clarity and distinctness men had been interested in establishing clarity and in making distinctions. For it is one thing to say that philosophy shall be concerned only with what is clear and distinct, and another to assert that philosophy will be concerned with all things in an attempt to render them clear and distinct. Some things are by their nature vague and indistinct, and it is peculiar to the kind of understanding we ask of philosophy that the criteria of clarity and distinctness themselves require that we understand clearly and distinctly the vague and indistinct character of whatever has those properties.

As a result of the scrutiny of modern logic and metaphysics, some of the elements which have been traditionally under analysis have exchanged the properties which were once believed to be peculiar to them. Philosophy has to account for atmospheric things, it has to account for values as well as for structures, for qualities as well as for quantities. Small wonder, then, that it cannot be as precise as mathematics. Belief in the precision of all branches of mathematics dates from the period before the immense researches into the foundations of mathematics. Now we should admit that what we once held to be as clear and distinct as anything could be—the definition of natural numbers, for instance—is in a confused muddle, having revealed depths of subtlety and confusion far beyond our usual expectations.

The realists have assumed that qualities are actual, while relations alone have also the being of possibilities. The argument has been made on the assumption that all possibilities are equally relations, those of quality as well as those of relation. But how can this be? For surely there is a difference between the possibility of a relation and that of a quality. If someone says, "Tomorrow I will pack two pairs of shoes in the trunk, which has four containers," it is not the same as if he were to say, "Before taking my shoes away with me, I shall have all of them dyed brown."

We know the difference between the number of the shoes and the color of the shoes, even though we know, in this case, only the number and not the particular shade of brown. We know the number precisely, but specification does not lay exclusive hold on possibility. We do not know the precise shade the shoes are to be dyed, that is true, but then we do not know the exact shoes, either. We only know them universally, which is to say functionally, for we know them *as shoes* but not as *what* shoes: sport shoes or walking shoes or dress shoes, for instance.

Let us put aside the question of the difference between the knowledge of the shoes as actual and consider them only as brown and as two pairs. The difference between quality and quantity, or between quality and relations, is that quantity is all or nothing: the true and false of logic or the firing and non-firing of neurons as described by neurophysiology. Quality is graded but continuous; quantity is discrete. There is such a thing as the change from one quality to another, but it is not the same thing as the change from one actual thing to another; when we paint a grey wall blue, for instance, and when we tear down a wall and erect a barn. Change is the transition from being to the other, but the mixing of colors must always be another color. Qualities are close, as for that matter are all essences.

It is time for a definition of quality, a definition which will enable us to meet the requirements of qualities both in actuality and in abstraction as essences. A quality is *that which is ultimately simple*. Qualities are incapable of further analysis. The analytical elements of that which produces the qualities are logical and have their own qualities. Qualities have their corresponding wavelengths, which are quantities and which as such can be analyzed. Numbers are sets having elements. But the qualities to which they correspond have no elements.

There are no other items in existence which are ultimately simple, and any that are must be qualities. To some extent the justification of this definition must depend upon the inability to demonstrate that there are things in the world which are ultimately simple and which are not qualities. There can be no final demonstration of this sort for it would depend upon an inexhaustible enumeration. The burden of the proof, however, remains upon the opposition to the definition.

Now if quality is simple, it cannot be the experience of a quality, for experiences are not sufficiently explained when we say that they are not simple, for they require the background of a complex subject of experience, a mechanism of sensation, which is notoriously complex. The sense experience of a quality is a complex reaction

to an object which in itself is simple. The experience of red is not red, only the red is. The experience of red is an activity on the part of a complex mechanism which enables the subject having the experience to perceive the redness of a red object, the redness of red, we might say. The experience of a quality *qua* experience is as simple as the quality experienced but different from the quality, to which we may return whenever we wish to renew the experience. The simplicity of the experience depends upon the simplicity of the quality which it resembles and which occasions it. The background of the experience is of course exceedingly complex, as complex as the mechanism of physiology which goes to make the experience possible. The neurophysiological mechanism which prepares the organism for the experience, and the effects of the experience, emotional, intellectual, or active, may be enormously complicated affairs.

But if quality is not a subjective sensation neither is it an objective material. Qualities are always found attached to substances. There is no such thing as the experience of red but always of something which is red. There are red materials—cloths, wooden surfaces, and even red liquids and gases; but there is no red as red, unattached yet available to experience.

We are now in the position of saying that quality is not in the subject experiencing the quality (although he may experience it) and it is not in the objects experienced (although it may be attached to such objects). It is something actual yet neither a subject nor an object; it is objective to the subject yet free of the object to which it may adhere. This would appear to be an impossible position. Perhaps we can illuminate it by a further examination, and we shall start by comparing our definition of quality with two other definitions which have been advanced in recent years.

The definition of quality given by Peirce is as follows: "Quality is the monadic element of the world."[1] We may construe the word, monad, for it is the key word in this definition, in either of two ways. It is a number, the number one; or it is ultimately simple.

If we take it in the former sense, then it is capable of further analysis, for the one is a set of which all singles are elements, and it becomes difficult to see how the monad can have anything in common with qualities. For in order to interpret quality in this way, we should have to choose some meaning of quality, or, worse still, some example of quality, and read it as a set of which all similar or identical instances would be elements. But a careful inspection will prove that there is no quality which can justify taking preced-

[1] *Collected Papers*, 1. 426.

ence over others. At first glance it may seem that the primary colors could claim preëminence, but even this is not the case. A primary color is no more a color than one which results from a mixture of the primary colors; red is no less a color than yellow, and for that matter also no more.

There is another argument which is capable of demolishing this interpretation of monad in the definition of quality as the monadic element in the world, where monad is conceived as the number, one. If quality is a number, even the number one, then it is not a quality but a quantity; or, perhaps we should have to say, there is no distinction between a quality and a quantity unless the word quality were to be reserved as a name for the first of the natural numbers. But in this case we should know nothing about the reason why the first natural number should exist in such vividity where the others do not. For a quality has a vibrancy which a pair or a triad does not.

We are left, in either case, with the second meaning of Peirce's definition, which proves to be the same as our own.

We might consider here one definition of quality, in order to dissociate it from traditions which have proved unsatisfactory explanations. Quality for Leibniz was "that determination of things which may be known in them when we consider them individually and for themselves, hence without any necessity for their being given together."[2] Evidently for Leibniz quality is perilously close to and dependent upon the meaning and definition of the substance in which it inheres or to which it is attached. Substances have been held since Aristotle to be individual and remain under the succession of qualities which do not. Quality, then, cannot be the individual determination of things unless we are to alter the definition of substance, for substance is not its qualities nor the qualities substance. Moreover, things can be considered individual when they are not considered in their qualitative aspect. Events as they are dated and placed are individual. The failure of Aristotle to make as clear a definition of quality as he did of primary substance has cost the tradition plenty in the way of confusion.

There is another tradition in the study of qualities which holds them in disregard as merely confused ideas. A quality according to this tradition is entirely subjective and results from being influenced by items from the external world rather than by being self-determined by rational thought subjectively generated. The notion that quantity is more real than quality, has a long history. It began, so far as our limited knowledge goes, with Pythagoras and runs through Spinoza. It may be characterized as intellectual-

[2] *Selections*, ed. by Philip P. Wiener (New York, Scribner, 1951), p. 203.

istic, as distinct from both irrational and—it should be emphasized —rational. That it should not be irrational is obvious from its emphasis on the power of thought, which is to say reasoning, but that it should not be rational, either, is not so obvious. The rational is the rational in the Greek sense: the assumption that logic is a property of the world, and human reasoning merely a reflection of it. We would do well to say a few words about each of these distinctions.

First as to quality in the sense of irrational. The argument runs somewhat as follows. "What is rational is also commensurable; quality is not commensurable; therefore quality is not rational." There are two fallacies involved here. It does not follow that because "what is rational is also commensurable" what is irrational is incommensurable. Defenders of the argument will maintain that incommensurability is what we mean by irrational. When they do so, however, they are assuming without proof that qualities are incommensurable. It is important to note that qualities have not been demonstrated to be incommensurable, in the same way, say, as the infinites in mathematics. The hypotenuse and the leg of an isosceles right triangle or $\sqrt{2}$ is incommensurable, but there is no evidence of any conclusive nature that a quality like sweetness is incommensurable. The point is that qualities may be incommensurable, but confusion results from talking about them as incommensurable, for when we do we are making qualities into sorts of quantities and then attributing to them the properties of some quantities. It is as though we were to say, "some stones exhibit anger" or "my grass lawn has presidential ambitions." The modes are not the same, and we cannot with profit shift from the one to the other.

Another argument for quality as irrational supposes that qualities are merely confused ideas. This position gains support from the fact that qualities are apprehended by, or may be conceived as similar to, the emotions; and the emotions, it can be shown easily, run counter to the reasons. It is the emotions which lead us to actions which we recognize as irrational. A major premise, namely, that since the effect of the emotions is irrational, what the emotions apprehend or what stimulates the emotions must be irrational also, has been slipped in here. There is no justification for it. We often act irrationally from events which can in no wise be characterized as irrational. Falsity cannot follow from truth but irrationality can be the result of falsely interpreted rationality. You may incorrectly sum up a column of figures and so wrongly conclude that you have been robbed, and as a result rise to such an anger that you behave irrationally and perhaps even commit a regrettable act.

We do not say that a bull acts in irrational anger when he reacts violently to the waving of a red cloth, but we say that a man does so when he behaves in a similar manner. But surely there is nothing irrational about the redness of the cloth, only about the interpretations which are put upon it by the bull and the man, and we excuse the bull because he is not a man and so, we consider, incapable of reason. We say that it is in the nature of the bull to react violently to the red cloth when what we mean is that we know he will do so, whereas it is not "in the nature" of the man to do so because the meaning of red in the cloth shifts from occasion to occasion. (Incidentally, why do we call the reaction of the emotion of anger irrational, when pleasure, which is an emotion also, is, if not held to be rational, at least not held not to be rational?)

The fact is that qualities are not confused ideas—they are not ideas at all. Behind the contention that they are lies the presupposition of preëminent reality with respect to the intellect. There is, it is asserted, only one supremely real element in the world, and this is thought or of the nature of thought. Thus anything else must be either less real or unreal. Qualities indubitably exist, and so cannot be unreal; therefore, they are of lesser reality. But do we have to accept the presupposition? Not necessarily; it means, as usual, that we shall not be surprised to have come upon an intellectual position when the fact is that we started from one. If we accept the premise which is presupposed, no wonder that we are caught in the conclusion. The thing to do here is to reject the premise. The evidence furnished by the fact of quality itself, its irreducible and indubitable character, is relevant, and the same can be said for the phenomena of activity.

There are three elements in the world, and it would seem that we can reduce everything to some one of them. They are: qualities, relations, and reactions. But we cannot succeed in reducing any of these to one of the others. This is not to say, of course, that we cannot read one in terms of another, as we do, for instance, when we refer to reactions as dynamic relations, or to qualities as confused ideas (i.e., relations). But reading one in terms of another is not the same as reducing one to another; we have confused language, we have not merged phenomena. Qualities are not irrational merely because they are not thoughts, any more than thoughts can be said to be insubtantial and so inconsequential because they are not qualities.

We have perhaps said enough to show that in the intellectualistic tradition the case for quality in the sense of irrational has not been successfully supported. We turn next to the proposal that quality be regarded as rational.

If we understand by the term "rational" an objective and independent logic which the mind apprehends in reasoning but which is by no means to be equated with such reasoning, or for that matter with any reasoning or rational processes at all, then we are in a position to consider whether quality is rational in this sense. The answer is no. What we mean by logic is not what we mean by quality, and what we mean by quality is not what we mean by logic. This is not to say that there may not be a correspondence between them. Every quality has its corresponding quantity. There is no abstract thought that is not accompanied by some image, however faint; there is no exercise of energy that does not occur in some amount. We measure *amounts* of quality, we do not measure quality. This is the point which enables theologians to charge that science only treats of surfaces, because it never gets down to essences, as though the ability to manipulate substances with their modifications and movement constituted some sort of inability to know them, while the inability to manipulate them had sprung from an ability to know them.

The situation can be somewhat aided so far as understanding goes if we introduce a new term. Suppose that we say that we shall approach the relation between qualities and logic from another quarter. We will hold that by rational is meant not only "analyzable by means of reason" but also "compatible with reason." That is rational, we shall contend in the case of qualities, which is capable of exhibiting rational correlates. In this sense, and in this sense only, it is proper to say that quality is rational. For it is equally true that if quality were analyzable it would not be ultimately simple and that if quality were dependent upon elements of logic it would not be ultimately simple, either. But the position advocated here is that quality is precisely that—ultimate simplicity; and so is neither analyzable into simpler elements nor dependent upon external elements of logic, which would be a complexity of some sort.

We turn now with some relief to a contemporary philosopher whose efforts to define quality in terms of language have led him to conclusions which are not very far removed from the ones we are maintaining. The phrase "ostensive definition" is an open acknowledgment that there are things which cannot be described in language but can only be indicated by pointing in some physical manner. In the way in which the term "ostensive" has been used, it means something close to what the nominalists mean: we define a term by indicating or enumerating its instances. Wittgenstein, however, has specifically rejected this interpretation.[3] There is another way of pointing, or, better still, perhaps there is another

[3] *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 383.

way of interpreting what pointing means. Wittgenstein proposed showing a number of multicolored pictures among which there was only one color in common, and this was to be called yellow ochre.[4] It does not follow that what we have been meaning is what Wittgenstein means, but it does follow that the meaning of what he has said can be used legitimately to round out what we have been maintaining.

The language of qualities performs a different service from the language of relations, of functions, or of actions. In the latter group we are accustomed to the verbal definitions of constant elements, while in the former we must content ourselves with naming. The words corresponding to qualities are like tickets attached to them, for that is all the definition of qualities can accomplish. Compare this now with the names for relations, where the definition can adequately, and often exhaustively, describe the relation. The color, red, is conventionally defined in dictionaries by its wave-length and place in the spectrum. But this is not red, this is its wave-length and the circumstances under which red is to be found and what its position is. The color, red—red as red—is left undefined, if we understand by definition the way in which for instance a triangle can be defined by three points. There is a sense in which qualities are ineffable because of the inadequacies of language; qualities are indescribable.

That qualities are ineffable must not be read as meaning that they are infinite. We are always sampling populations which may well be infinite, and we do this in every act of experience; but we are also conducting such sampling in terms of a finite number of instances. In other words, we are often in the position of making infinite guesses from finite information. This is a description of classical induction. Still another prospect is open, and it is contained in the following question. Can we construct a picture of possibility using exactly the information we have and working by means of extension or extrapolation but without infinite guesses? We want, let us say, to construct a finite ontology with abstract objects corresponding as closely as possible to the concrete collections that we know about from our experience. Such a construction would operate chiefly in terms of limits. It would be positive rather than critical; that is to say, it would not deny the infinite as a possible construction; yet it would not insist upon it. Ineffable, then, does not mean infinite; it means ultimately simple and unanalyzable—finite.

The argument for the finiteness of qualities is reinforced if we consider the possibility that qualities may have a quality in com-

[4] *Ibid.*, I, 72.

mon. Suppose that we entertain the speculation that there is in a sense only one quality. The role of logic with respect to quality now becomes clearer. Logic serves as a sort of diffraction grating; it breaks up the quality into qualities. So we think there are qualities, and in fact there are. The colors obtained by interfering with white light by means of a spectrum are genuine. In the case of the quality which qualities have in common and which could be restored by eliminating logic, nobody has experienced it so far as we know. The richness of difference none the less may depend upon the existence of similarities. In the order of experience, qualities tend to spread, reason to combine; yet in the order of being qualities may combine and reason spread. In either case, what the qualities have in common is a kind of insistence, which may well be the quality to which they are reducible.

Such is the nature of the world of logic, that the qualities reassert themselves when they are denied. Pictures are inevitable, qualities give rise to other qualities, with some reliance on the background. Qualities have an insistence even in their passive aspect, which can be escaped only with difficulty. They play a role as feelings and inherent axioms. For instance, if a man loses his job because of drunkenness, he would live to find that the consequences had not been worth it, but he would have thought that it was well worth it *at the time*. Thus qualities which we admire when we feel them may lead by a very good logic to other qualities, such as justice produces, which we admire only when we feel them applying to others.

Qualities, then, carry to us the flavor of survival, for they are fixed and held in some way which effloresces; each occasion of a quality has its own aroma of permanence. Here in existence and affixed to substances is a sample of how things are. Quality, we might almost say, is how being defends itself. Herbart's view of quality was not so far from this. We must enter a caution, however, for qualities, like universals, do not persist; the brown of the brown suit that was dyed blue is gone. But the same shade of brown could and indeed does recur. Thus qualities are not persistent but recurrent.[5]

They return and when they return they are the same qualities. The rhythm of recurrence, of departure and identical return, seems to have a strength and a stability not accorded to more substantial things. Qualities have the irreducibility that they possess as attached to substances, and an indestructibility which belongs to them in virtue of their situation as possibilities. For qualities are es-

[5] Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), p. 126.

sences, which is to say, conditions, and conditions do not float lazily above the world; they have no outriders. We must not think of them as actual things or even as things. They return to things under the genus of recurrence. In the metaphysics of realism, participation is the basic metaphor, just as reflection is for idealism or inherence for Hegelianism.

We owe to the independent qualities not merely the quality of our own awareness but probably the awareness itself. Were the world all one quality, we should never know it. Awareness depends upon discrimination, hence feeling upon diversity. It is the richness of the variety of qualities in the world which enables us to apprehend the world. At the bottom of the sea as well as in the stratosphere, colors parade in immense diversity, as recent travellers to both areas have reported. It is upon such phenomena that philosophy must stay. Substantial after a fashion, evanescent after another, stubborn yet elusive, the qualities remain, fixed elements in a changing assortment of combinations, the atoms of the sensual life, amenable to logic but only at a distance, as flesh follows bone yet remains flesh, wearing ever unworn and bearing always the promise of surprise and of novelty.

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THE MORAL AND THE AXIOLOGICAL "OUGHT"—AN ATTEMPT AT A DISTINCTION

IT has recently been argued by Everett W. Hall in his acute study, *What is Value,* that only some such sentence as *"A* ought to be *B"* can show the structure of value and that what it says cannot be conveyed by any corresponding declarative or imperative sentence. In this paper, however, we shall not be concerned with the general nature of "ought" or even with the question whether it exhausts the notion of value with which it is so intimately connected, but only with the important fact that it shows deep "typal" differences in its application to different fields.

The field within which the "ought" is considered to be usually applicable divides itself naturally into two parts. The one is primarily concerned with the other persons among whom one finds oneself, while the other is oriented to aspects, objects, and situations which have no direct relevance to persons other than oneself. The "ought" that operates with respect to the former field may be designated as the moral "ought."[1] With respect to the latter,

[1] The use of the term "moral" should not lead to any confusion. "Moral values" are generally considered to be second-level values which are realized

it may be designated as the axiological "ought." It shall be the purpose of this paper to show that there are some important differences between the two and that this has consequences for ethical theory which have generally been neglected.

That man finds himself among others is a situational feature of his life. The situation, however, is always structured in terms of different roles which are oriented to different value-patterns. Recent studies in social anthropology and sociology have conclusively shown, especially in the recent work of Talcott Parsons, *The Social System,* that the interactive behavior of persons is always oriented to role-expectations which are defined in terms of patterned norms. The complementary expectations give rise to an "ought" whose generalized fulfillment is the *conditio sine qua non* of the functioning and, thus, the very existence of any social system.

The obligatoriness that arises from the "ought" in the axiological field, however, has no such complementary character. There is no correlate complementarity to the obligation that I feel with respect to, for example, "the realization of beauty" (whatever that may mean). There is no complementary obligatoriness because there are no complementary role-expectations. The obligatoriness which is felt with respect to values that are neither primarily derived from nor oriented to other persons, thus, reveals perhaps more clearly the nature of value-obligatoriness than that which arises from the essentially interpersonal situation of man.

The moral "ought," in fact, is contingent in a double sense. It is contingent, first, on the existence of the other person in relation to whom the "ought" arises and, second, on his at least relative fulfillment of the complementary role-expectations without which there can be no interactive relationship between persons. To give but one example, the "ought" that arises with respect to one's friend is not merely contingent on the friend's existence but also on his fulfillment of the relevant obligations that follow from his role as a friend. There is, of course, a varying margin within which different role-behaviors may vary but there is always some

in the pursuit of first-level values. Thus, in a sense, the pursuit of any value may be considered to be a moral pursuit and the obligatoriness that is felt towards any value, a moral obligatoriness. However, we would have to admit a distinction among first-level values, viz., between those that arise from the existence of other persons in their specific relation to me or even from the general fact that there are persons other than myself and those that do not so arise. Even if it be true that the apprehension of all values presupposes the existence of persons other than myself and my active interrelation with them—even then we would have to distinguish between the values that are apprehended with respect to other persons and values which are not so oriented in their reference. It is this distinction among first-level values that we wish to point out and it does not matter how we choose to designate it.

sort of a limit beyond which the complementary ought-obligatoriness is considered definitely to cease.

It may be contended that the "oughtness" of the ought is in no way affected by this contingency. The contingency, in effect, is a change in situation and any change in situation must affect the "ought-content" in some form or another. But, as we said at the very beginning, we do not intend to discuss the general nature of "ought" in this paper. However, even if the contention be correct, it does not affect what we are trying to point out. The interpersonal situation is *essentially* changing because of the possible non-existence of the person concerned or the non-fulfillment of his complementary role-obligations. But such a situation does not obtain with respect to the axiological situation of man. The obligatoriness that is here felt is not contingent, at least, in the same sense, for the situation that gives rise to it does not seem to be so changing.

The types of contingency that we are trying to point out with respect to the moral "ought" should not, however, lead us to think that what we are trying to point out is something akin to Kant's distinction between duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. Leaving aside the question whether there is any meaning in the notion of "imperfect obligation," we should be able to see that such a distinction does not correspond to the type of distinction that we are trying to point out. Even if such a distinction be admitted, it would cut across the distinction that we are pointing to. The obligations arising with respect to persons may be either perfect or imperfect and so also the obligations that arise with respect to what we have chosen to call the axiological situation of man. Hartmann's distinction between "ought-to-do" and "ought-to-be" is also not the same as this distinction—for, both the moral and the axiological "ought" belong to the class of "ought-to-do" rather than "ought-to-be."

The contingency that we noted in the case of the moral "ought" is not so much a contingency in the nature of the "ought" as in the object with respect to which the "ought" arises. On the other hand, the object of the axiological "ought" does not share such characteristics and, therefore, such an "ought" does not possess that type of contingency.

From another point of view, however, the content of the moral "ought" seems to be fairly specific and determinate while, in contrast to this, the content of the axiological "ought" appears to be more general and indeterminate in character. The social patterning of norms with respect to which the mutual interaction of persons is oriented, provides that specific determinateness without

which there can be no complementary inter-locking of behavior-expectations and, thus, no interaction. Such a situation is not entirely absent from the field of the axiological "ought." The scientist, the artist, and even the mystic are not merely oriented to the patterned behavior-expectations of these roles as socialized in society but also to methodological and evaluative norms as practiced and formulated within their own fields. But, in the last analysis, the obligatoriness that is felt within these fields is fundamentally to one's own vision and not to what others think or say or value. In science, the necessity of interpersonal verification imposes some limits that give an appearance to the contrary. But increasingly in the case of the artist and almost completely in the case of the mystic, the "apparent" nature of such an appearance is revealed. The loyalty here is purely to the transpersonally prehended value and not to what others say, think, or feel about it. In fact, the claim of the value prehended may be felt to be of so absolute a character that the scientist, the artist, or the mystic may feel compelled to assert it even against the whole world and at the cost of his life. The locus of value prehension is, thus, seen to be in the individual and the "ought"-claim of values is revealed to be essentially non-social in nature.

But such a situation cannot obtain in the field of the moral "ought." It is, of course, true that the Upanishadic, the Stoic, and the Christian attempt to give value to each individual *qua* individual and the consequent need of feeling the "ought"-obligatoriness toward every person just by virtue of his being a person, was a great advance in the valuational exploration of man. But this does not replace the fact that the obligatoriness that arises with respect to persons arises not merely because of their being persons, but because they stand in certain specific relations to one another. Such relations are always socially patterned and though in all such relations one can behave well or ill, yet the content of what behavior is called "well" is always determined by the socialized role-pattern in which one happens to stand. One may behave well towards a servant or a slave or a prisoner but this does not destroy the fact that the very content of behavior in such a situation is different from the behavior in other role-situations. In fact, it cannot be otherwise. For any successful interaction between persons presupposes mutually complementary behavior-expectations and this can only be so if their behavior is oriented to patterns that are presupposed and accepted by them. In exceptional cases, two persons may explore a new pattern of interpersonal relationships; but even here there would be mutual acceptance and a certain limit beyond which the exploration cannot stretch.

It would be too much to say that no new patterns can be explored in human interrelationships. Recent work in comparative anthropology and group-dynamics shows how much there is to be done in this field. Stuart Chase's recent survey in his *Roads to Agreement* is simultaneously an eye-opener and a challenge. It should be read by everyone interested in better intra-group and inter-group relationships. What we are pointing to, however, is the fact that ought-obligatoriness in society presupposes a pre-existent role-pattern which is only to be fulfilled and not explored.

The ought-obligatoriness that arises when we prehend the necessity for new types of behavior-patterns in human interrelationships is, however, of a different type. Here we have not to observe or fulfill a pre-existent pattern but creatively to prehend a new value and translate it into the world of recalcitrant fact. In this it meets a limitation which is absent both from the field of the moral and the axiological "ought." The value that is creatively prehended has to be realized in the world of interpersonal relationships but in order that such a realization may occur it is necessary that it be *accepted* by the persons or the groups concerned. Such a situation does not obtain either in the case of the moral or the axiological "ought"—for, in the case of the former, the role-situation has already a pre-existent pattern which has been internalized through the familiar processes of socialization while in the case of the latter the question of others' acceptance does not arise as they do not enter into the picture at all.

There remains, however, always a temptation on the part of the moral prophet to realize the "ought" that he has discerned by imposing it forcibly on others. Coërcion rather than persuasion has always seemed a tempting short-cut to many a moral prophet. But there could be no better way for defeating their purpose since the use of force precludes the willing acceptance of the new value. The essence of value consists not in compulsive coërcion but in a claim that is acknowledged and assented to—a claim which demands, yet does not necessitate, its own realization. Such a possibility of the use of coërcive force for the realization of the moral "ought" does not exist in respect of the axiological "ought." There, as no direct relation to other persons exists, the question of the use of force does not arise. The prehension of a new value in the field of the moral "ought" may, thus, be regarded as providing a transition between the "ought" arising from role-situation, or what Bradley has called "my station and its duties," and the "ought" arising from the so-called axiological situation of man. The transitional "ought" shows clearly that the primary obligatoriness is to the value and that the locus of value-prehension lies not

in the society but in the individual. The transitional "ought," however, is still bound to the structurally differentiated social situation of man and, for its realization, to other peoples' acceptance. Such a limitation does not operate in the case of the axiological "ought."

The deep difference between the moral and the axiological "ought" may also be seen in the fact that the two are, in many cases, in essential conflict with each other. When the intellectual, the artist, or the mystic neglects his social or domestic duties, he does so because of the call of a higher but conflicting value. Buddha leaving his wife and child and kingdom at the dead of night for the sake of a possible realization whose glimpse even he had not yet received is the eternal symbol of the call of the supra-moral and the supra-sociological in man's life. The revolutionary, too, may neglect his social or domestic duties but his loyalty remains oriented towards them, though at a different level. He essentially wants to and, therefore, must weave a new pattern of social interrelationships in which he too would be a partaker and not a silent spectator. The mystic, on the other hand, may but need not return to society —and even if he does, he never enmeshes himself in the network of social rights and duties. The truth-seeker and the artist, in their own turn, feel the call and the loyalty to their vision and if there be any conflict between these and the duties of personal or social obligation, there is little doubt in their minds as to their choice or, at least, as to which they ought to choose.

The social situation of man seems, in fact, just a precondition for the realization of supra-sociological values. Just as men must live in order that values relevant to social structuring may arise, so there must be some ordered social structure with its system of complementary claims or what Malinowski has called "the principle of reciprocity," so that supra-sociological values may occur. It would be wrong to interpret this, as many eminent social and psychological thinkers have done, to mean that the whole complex social structure is merely an elaborate and roundabout means to be biologically alive and the pursuit of supra-sociological values a still more indirect way of making the social structure function and thus ensuring the biological survival of the individual and his race. Such an interpretation would be as much correct as if someone were to say that life is merely a complicated, roundabout, and extremely indirect way of being dead, i.e., of returning to the inorganic state of matter. To understand the supra-sociological values as performing a lubricating function in the functioning of the social structure is, then, to misunderstand their essential nature. It would be almost equally tragic if the multifarious network of social interrela-

tionships were treated as a mere instrument for the satisfaction of biological needs. The values that are realized at these different levels have a claim in their own right and not merely as an instrument for other values. In short they have an intrinsicality of their own that demands a value-realization for its own sake and not that of anything else.

The relation between the "ought-claims" which arise from the interpersonal situation of man and those that arise from what we have characterized as his axiological situation may be designated, in Hartmann's terminology, as that which obtains between "stronger" and "weaker" values. The "stronger" value, according to Hartmann, is that which does not need for its existence another value which, however, in its own turn necessarily presupposes the "stronger" and is, thus, characterized as the "weaker." The "stronger" value, on the other hand, is always the "lower" in Hartmann's system, while the "weaker" is correspondingly the "higher" in the scale of values. The axiological "ought" thus presupposes for its realization the relative fulfllment of the moral "ought." Buddha may leave his wife and child and kingdom but only on the precondition that there shall be others—and a fairly large number, too—who shall continue to love and live with their wives, bring up their children and maintain the social order by the use of legal or customary sanctions, i.e., in short, rule the state. There seems also little doubt that the intellectual, aesthetic, or spiritual value for which people give up personal and social obligations is undoubtedly a higher value than the day-to-day fulfillment of customary obligations. The martyr who stakes his life, rather than give up the value whose claim he prehends in these different fields, is the clearest symbol of the secondary character of obligations that arise within the field of interpersonal relationships.

This may seem surprising to many ethical thinkers who have, in the main, tried to understand the nature of value-obligatoriness through the "moral" rather than the axiological "ought." The primacy of the moral "ought" has been so much taken for granted in ethical discussion that the supra-personal and supra-social nature of values seems to have been entirely forgotten. The whole set of questions centering about *prima facie* rightness, duties, obligations, sanctions, punishment, etc., reveals this wrong orientation. The classic case with which ethics is or should be concerned is, according to these thinkers, whether their names be Ross or Kant or anything else, the fulfillment of promise—the example *par excellence* of the moral "ought." Even those who have found in the concept of the "good life" the central focus of their ethical thought have failed to see that the "ought"-claim of axiological values is not exactly

the claim for a "good life." The claim is rather for the objectivating of a value that is vaguely, but, at the same time, irresistibly apprehended. The life of many an artist can in no wise be described as a "good life"—nor was it in any sense a pursuit of such a life. Yet the claim that they prehended—a Baudelaire, Van Gogh, Dostoevsky, or any other name that you can imagine—seems to reveal more the nature of values than the so-called leaders of "good life."

In fact, the judgment that their lives were not "good" emanates from the field of the moral "ought." It merely means the non-observance or even the positive violation of the customary "Do's" and "Don'ts" of their society. The assumption behind the concept of the "good life" seems to be that there are not different types of "ought" and that even if there are, they are not in essential conflict. The essentially anthropocentric character of the concept shows that it is derived from the field of the moral "ought"—the field of interpersonal relationships whose last term is society or humanity and not anything beyond or outside it. The axiological "ought," on the other hand, is not so socio-or-anthropo-centric. Rather, it reveals the transcendent nature of the value-claim and orientates humanity to a trans-human dimension.

Thus, the differences in the nature of the moral and the axiological "ought" seem to have some important consequences both for value-theory and value-attitudes. The primacy and the emphasis that we accord to the one or the other seems to make a relevant difference to our valuational thought and vision. We are not here, however, interested in working out the details of such consequences but only in pointing out that there is a distinction between the "ought-claims" that arise in different fields and that this distinction has some relevance for ethical thinking.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. MAURICE MANDELBAUM. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press [1955]. 338 pp. $5.00.

Dedicated to such a subtle and outstanding thinker as Wolfgang Köhler this treatise contains a considerable number of closely reasoned and complicated methodological discussions. It is not phenomenology in the sense of the German leaders of that movement. The author is not a strict adherent of Husserl or of Scheler. But this should be considered neither a mark of distinction nor the contrary.

Basic preliminary questions of any possible ethical theory are analyzed here with great nicety and precaution. The final goal, however, is the highest any moralist can set himself at the present time: to unearth the sources of moral controversies and to resolve mere "disparities" as well as more fundamental "disagreements" concerning moral judgments.

To reach out for this high aim a fair apparatus of new terminology is introduced. Professor Mandelbaum distinguishes, e.g., between direct and removed judgments of moral rightness and wrongness. By the first type he "denotes those judgments made by an agent who is directly confronted by a situation which he believes involves a moral choice on his part" (pp. 45, 95). "Removed judgments of moral rightness or wrongness," however, "are the moral judgments of an observer, not of the agent himself"; and the judgments which we make concerning the rightness or wrongness of our own *past* actions are identical in principle with them (p. 95). Among the judgments of moral worth of a character "there are no analogues of direct moral judgments"; all the judgments of moral worth are passed upon the character of another person "or upon our own character when viewed as another might view it" and, therefore, they are removed judgments (p. 135), while all judgments "binding upon action" are direct judgments (pp. 281, 285). Moral assertions made under duress or for the sake of gaining power and the like are termed "spurious," and Mandelbaum insists that these spurious statements should not be considered as invalid judgments but as no moral judgments at all (p. 247 f.). As to "derivative" moral assertions, that is, those taken over merely by habit or on the authority of others, "we are only slightly less severe"; but neither spurious nor derivative moral statements can be regarded as valid or invalid. They have to be dismissed as non-genuine, non-original moral judgments.

All questions concerning moral *truths* and a "single universally acceptable contentual standard for conduct" are "by-passed" by Mandelbaum (pp. 35 f., 185). Instead, he wishes to limit himself to a "non-contentual approach" to moral judgments (p. 185), to a concentration on "their structural properties rather than their specific content" (p. 263); and in this way he prefers securing criteria of valid ethical judgment to "establishing . . . specific moral truths" (p. 185). At any rate, within this "formal," non-contentual aspect of ethical thought, he believes he can provide new important insights by pointing to three principles which are, according to him, indispensable standards for the validity of all ethical judgment and the removal of moral controversies.

The first of these principles is called by him the "principle of

the primacy of the facts," and runs thus: "To be valid, the predication of a moral quality must arise as a direct response to the apprehension of the non-moral properties which the object which is praised or blamed actually possesses" (p. 245). By urging the importance of this principle, Mandelbaum is certainly in full agreement with a main theme of Charles L. Stevenson's *Ethics and Language.*

The second criterion of moral validity is named "the principle of universality." It says: "To be valid a moral judgment must make an assertion which is not restricted by a reference to the conditions under which the judgment was made" (p. 263). Mere consistency of a moral assertion with other assertions is, as Mandelbaum points out in this connection, not a sufficient criterion of the validity of these ethical statements. The entire set of these assertions may be false and a judgment not consistent with this set may be true (p. 267). Also the reference to psychological explanations of the causes of an error in previous statements gives no guarantee that a present moral assertion is free from other errors caused by other psychological conditions.

What is needed here is the appeal to the principle of universality. If we, for instance, realize that our former moral opinions were too "romantic," it is not enough to feel assured that we are now "realists." We must at least be certain that the realistic approach to morality is the universally valid one and not the romantic or idealistic point of view (pp. 266 ff., 270). But, of course, this principle of universality, too, can secure only the "formal" validity of our judgments, not their contentual truth.

The same, naturally, applies to Mandelbaum's third principle, "the principle of ultimacy," which is stated as follows: "Any moral judgment which is believed to be valid is incorrigible and any incorrigible moral judgment must be acknowledged to be binding upon thought and upon action" (p. 277). This third principle "presupposes" the two others; and also the second principle is "closely related" to the first one (pp. 277, 294). But the principle of the primacy of the facts "says nothing concerning the assertoric character of moral judgment," while the principle of universality says nothing explicitly about a necessary "direct response" to the facts (p. 294); and neither of these two principles covers the full ground of the third one. Therefore, despite all their inter-relationships analyzed here, the three principles must, according to Mandelbaum, be distinguished from each other.

If we encounter disparities between moral judgments concerning the non-moral elements of the judgment, disparities "which spring directly from differences in factual belief," we may remove

the ensuing controversies by an appeal to the principle of the primacy of the facts (pp. 292, 295). If, however, these differences are "due to the effect of emotions or sentiments" thwarting impartial apprehension of facts, we may, in principle, remove the discrepancies by invoking the principle of universality, which does not permit partial interpretation of facts (pp. 293, 295).

But if disagreements are at stake which concern the moral characteristics of what is being judged or the moral adequacy of one point of view or another regarding the facts, then the reference to the principle of universality will enable us to solve only some controversies in principle, not all of them (pp. 300 f.). If there is disagreement concerning the degree of moral praise or blame to be assigned to each of two actions, a joint appeal to the principle of the primacy of the facts and the principle of universality may settle the difficulties (pp. 302 f.). If disagreements arise only as to some moral properties in a specific case, the principle of universality may help to overcome them (p. 305).

If, however, ethical controversies stem from "differences in personality," again in numerous cases no agreement may be obtainable (p. 304). And if, finally, divergencies of opinion rest upon a *total incapacity* of one person to feel the demands felt by another when they view an identical situation, then no reconciliation whatsoever is possible between the opposed moral estimates. Yet the author thinks it difficult to establish that such cases exist (pp. 305, 334). (I wonder, however, whether it cannot be sufficiently evidenced that, say, the moral outlook of an active pacifist is irreconcilable with that of an unrepenting mass murderer; and, unfortunately, ethical discrepancies of this type are only too often of world-wide consequence. About twenty years ago the Quaker Rufus M. Jones declared, for instance, that to speak to Nazi leaders is like talking to the North Pole; and Joseph Goebbels wrote at the same time that the morality of Berlin on the one hand and that of London and Washington on the other had nothing in common.)

This summary of some salient points of Mandelbaum's analyses, however sketchy, gives, I hope, some fair impression of the work done by this type of phenomenology. It is meritorious work insofar as it makes articulate divers implications of formal presuppositions of valid moral judgments. Often what is said gives hardly more than an application of logical and epistemological principles to ethics; but this should not detract from the merit of the discussions. It should also be welcome that the author always tries to be on his guard against any uncritical missionary zeal to obtain contentual ethical insights not universally acceptable, and that he refuses to rely on an initial distinction between an enlightened and

an unenlightened moral consciousness (p. 18). But how far has he succeeded in his main endeavors?

It seems to me that, while he painstakingly tried to exclude any unchecked possible inferences from his formal statements, considerably more tangible ethical convictions crept in and remained unexamined. He maintains, for instance, that if "considerations of self have been unduly neglected" in forming a moral judgment or "if an interest in self is the distorting factor . . . we do not consider either judgment to be valid"; but he adds that in the former case "we do not censure the person to the same degree" as in the latter (pp. 249, 330, note 13). These remarks certainly presuppose the completely unexplored validity of a whole system of middle-of-the-road contentual ethics in which neither exclusive self-regarding nor exclusive self-denying attitudes are considered valuable, but the selfish ones are regarded as more objectionable than the unselfish.

Moreover, in these reflections it remains entirely open to question what can be called "undue" negligence of self in forming moral judgments or what can be named a moral judgment which, despite the self-interest of the judge, is an adequate "response to what the situation itself is held to demand" (p. 249). Ascetic Christian ethics and master morality would hold even opposite views on what is morally justified self-interest in this respect. Neither Christian asceticism, however, nor the ethics of power nor any critical ethics would be able to accept Mandelbaum's vague and uncritical presuppositions as to judging self-interest in this regard. And thus, to rely in all such cases on phenomenological experience would only reveal the truth of Goethe's saying that even our seemingly incontestable concrete experience already contains the elements of a theory.

It seems to be only a matter of course to believe, as does Professor Mandelbaum, that "no moralist . . . has ever contended that man has an obligation to do something which does not lie within his powers" (p. 23 f.). But, in fact, this statement proves only the correctness of that old rule of wisdom: "Never say never." Nietzsche, and Manto in Goethe's *Faust*, explicitly exclaimed: "I love him who seeks the impossible"; and such types of widely influential ethics as that of Schopenhauer as well as that of numerous Christian and Hindu mystics demanded self-mortification of the will without suicide—obviously also an aim which, in truth, does not lie within man's power. From the point of view of the historian of ethics, other statements of Mandelbaum, too, seem to me questionable, for example, the belief that "little has been said concerning the question of what constitutes an adequate method" for nor-

mative ethics, while, in fact, we have in Kant, Fichte, Hermann Cohen, Herbert J. Paton, Axel Hägerström, and others an extended and hardly negligible literature on that score.

So to me the conclusion seems unavoidable that, even despite the attempt at rigid limitation to non-contentual problems, either the results of merely formal analyses remain deplorably meager or inadvertently they include unexamined contentual presuppositions which are highly controversial; and in the latter case, the moralist is overtaken by the sad fate of that hunter who, while protecting himself successfully from the sting of mosquitoes, falls victim to the jaws of the lions.

But if this is so, may not an avowedly contentual principle, if assumed as a mere hypothesis, offer the same degree of certainty of its implications as do Mandelbaum's attempts at merely formal analyses? At the same time, however, such a contentual principle as that of critical consistent hedonism would present considerably more rewarding ethical insights. After all, modern physics did very well in adopting a similar contentual principle, the principle of the necessary ultimate verification of physical observations by contentual empirical data of the senses. And physics did so in strict opposition to all "formal," *a priori* metaphysics of nature previously flourishing. Yet this is certainly not the place to follow these questions up in any more detail. I have done so on other occasions.

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The Structure of Metaphysics. MORRIS LAZEROWITZ. With a Foreword by John Wisdom. New York: The Humanities Press [1955]. 280 pp. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) $5.00.

This is a disappointing book but a very important one, particularly for those who do not adequately distinguish between Vienna positivism and the current English "ordinary language" school. It is important because it is a serious appreciation of metaphysics written in the English vein, which ought to put an end to the idea that linguistic philosophy is necessarily anti-metaphysical. Not, of course, that metaphysicians will all be satisfied with Professor Lazerowitz' account or that his attitude towards metaphysics is somehow inherent in the English approach, but it should be clear, now, that the technique is capable of constructive insights which metaphysicians would do well to understand. One might wish to reply to this book, to be sure, but such a reply would not

be a *defense* of metaphysics. Professor Lazerowitz has written not an attack but an examination; he is no more anti-metaphysics than Hume was anti-causality.

In form, the book is a collection of essays, most of which have been previously printed elsewhere, but it is not a miscellany. The first essay, "Moore's Paradox" (from the Schilpp volume), indicates some peculiarities of metaphysics. The second (new) accounts for them with a theory about "The Nature of Metaphysics," which the remaining essays are supposed to illustrate. The disappointingness of the book lies in the failure of these later essays to expand the most important and exciting part of the general theory.

In the king-pin essay, "The Nature of Metaphysics," Professor Lazerowitz considers a number of going "hypotheses" before offering his own. Metaphysical statements seem to be about phenomena, but they are not empirical because no confrontation with fact will cause a metaphysician to give one up. Indeed, the sort of facts which seem to be incompatible with such statements ("Here's one hand, and here's another") are so easily available and so glaringly incompatible with what the statements seem to assert ("There are no material objects") that it is incredible that anyone could mean them that way. At the same time, metaphysics cannot be *a priori* because this hypothesis will explain no better than the first one why metaphysical disputes should be eternally unsettleable. Further, "Whatever it is that we do know in knowing an *a priori* proposition, it is clear that in knowing it we know no fact about the world" (p. 41); yet part of the importance of metaphysics to us is that we do take it for "deep theories about aspects of reality" (p. 42). Nor is metaphysics "verbal," for,

> according to this interpretation, a philospoher who declares that space is self-contradictory and therefore unreal is in effect maintaining that the word 'space' has no literal use and that phrases using space-indicating words, that is, phrases like "taller than" and "next to," are senseless and have no application. [P. 45.]

But, such phrases *have* application, and, again, these applications are so obvious and citing them has so little effect on the metaphysician that we cannot believe that he means to deny them. Finally, Professor Lazerowitz rejects the hypothesis that metaphysics is nonsense:

> . . . we may wonder how anyone could bring himself to believe that since it is easy to fall into talking nonsense, it is reasonable to think that philosophers could, for so many centuries, have devoted their intellectual abilities to the concoction of nonsense, and, moreover, could have retained their interest in the *same* nonsense. [P. 52.]

The positivistic hypothesis, he says, is the effect, not the cause of a desire to disparage metaphysics. The verification theory of meaning is an assertion, not a proof, that metaphysics is nonsense.

What then is metaphysics? It has, says Professor Lazerowitz, a "three-layer structure," each layer of which is essential. On the surface, there is an illusion of empirical import. This is why metaphysical statements are always in the material mode. In fact, however, they are "linguistic innovations," logically true statements in a revised language. The "arguments" which "prove" such statements in the face of apparently conflicting facts are really revisions of key terms in order to give them universal application at the expense of empirical content. Metaphysics, then, is "justly described as a game played with language; but there is nothing frivolous about the game" (p. 68). It has a deep purpose, just as dreams have a hidden psychic purpose:

> . . . a philosopher who unalterably and with complete assurance maintains that change is unreal is, under the guise of making a scientific statement, covertly reassuring himself against certain feared changes . . . [p. 69],

notably, the great change of death.

> The metaphysician of permanence has turned out to be . . . a skilful semantic illusionist with the serious purpose of helping us through life. [P. 78.]

This third layer explains the point of the first two. Language must be revised in order to describe the world in such a way as to satisfy our emotional needs, but if the revision is to serve this purpose it must be disguised as a "deep truth about the nature of things" (p. 79).

This theory will explain all the peculiarities of metaphysical discussion which Professor Lazerowitz has noted: the endlessness of debate, the imperviousness to confrontation with facts (including linguistic facts) of what seem to be empirical views, the conclusiveness to one man of an argument which is unsatisfactory to another, and all the rest. It will also explain some other things. Philosophies have "flavors," as we all know, but without some such view as this it is hard to say just why materialism, for instance, should perennially be a "radical" philosophy as against "conservative" idealism. Again, nominalism, which is a pretty abstruse metaphysical system, is associated with individualistic political programs. There is, of course, some analogy between the nominalistic universe and the individualistic society, but surely the one does not "follow" from the other except at the level of Professor Lazerowitz' third layer. Further, we can explain the pretty general image of the stoic as the type of the philosopher, because the function of philosophy, on this theory, is to make the world livable by adjusting

not the world but our thinking and feeling about it. The unphilosophical problem of evil is how to do away with it; the philosophical problem is how to reconcile ourselves to its existence.

There is some danger that this thesis might lead to a strictly *ad hominem* examination of metaphysical views, but it is not inherent in the theory that it should. It would surely be a mistake if criticism of metaphysics turned into the psychoanalysis of metaphysicians, but this is not the same as examining the psychological functions of metaphysical systems. What Professor Lazerowitz has done is to turn on metaphysical statements the characteristic English question, "What is the point?" If language is a tool kit, understanding a sentence is knowing the use to which it can be put. Professor Lazerowitz' rhetoric sometimes sounds like biography, but when he says that the metaphysician "is covertly reassuring himself against certain feared changes," he is no more talking about a personal history than the literary critic who begins, "In this poem the poet tells us . . . ," is talking about a poet.

The trouble with the book is not that it contains the wrong kind of criticism but that it does not contain enough criticism of the right type. The first two layers of metaphysical statements are exhibited over and over in essays on a good variety of issues, but the vital third layer is only referred to occasionally in little cryptic suggestions. This is too bad for several reasons. First, because the first two layers are relatively familiar, and we usually find them involved with the old "therapeutic" idea that metaphysics is a mistake and the job of philosophers is to untangle a misused terminology. The importance of the third layer, after all, is that it is here that the first two are explained and justified. By leaving out the psychological function of the linguistic innovations he exhibits, Professor Lazerowitz makes his essays seem more like exposés than they are meant to be. Further, we should have had more treatment in detail of the third layer in order to support the general thesis, of course, but, more important, because this is not the kind of theory which can be left in outline sketch. Sometimes, as with the sense-data analysis of material objects, for example, it is enough to show that something can in principle be done without doing it in detail. Here, the value of the theory lies in the kind of criticism it can lead to, and without that criticism the thesis remains just a suggestive idea.

Possibly, the reason for this serious omission is that most of the essays in the book were written some time ago, and they may antedate the idea of the third layer altogether. The book suffers considerably from the fact that Professor Lazerowitz has reprinted his essays raw without reworking them into a more coherent whole.

The idea of linguistic innovation is developed afresh in each chapter, and the drama of discovery gets a little cloying the fourth time through. Even apart from the continuing theme, there is a disjointed repetition of the many good bits of analysis of particular questions which the book contains. In the chapter on "Logical Necessity," for instance, there is a very nice distinction between logical and physical impossibility which clearly belongs in the essay. The same point is a relevant auxiliary to the discussion in "Appearance and Reality," however, so we get two complete accounts of the same point. All this repetition is quite proper so long as the essays are meant to be taken separately, as they were originally printed, but since they are now all together in a book which does have a unified theme, the various points would better have been consolidated, connected, and enriched.

It would be pointless to comment on these essays *ad passim*, since most of them are already familiar, but there is a question worth raising about the main theme. Professor Lazerowitz writes as a philosopher of philosophy. One would think that philosophy of philosophy is still philosophy, but it is not at all clear that Professor Lazerowitz considers his theory reflexive. Like the metaphysicians he discusses, he speaks in the empirical mode. His theory is a "hypothesis" in competition with other hypotheses, which he rejects by indicating "facts" about metaphysics and metaphysicians which are incompatible with or unexplained by the competing hypotheses. He shows us how metaphysicians alter language in order to assimilate or distinguish sets of facts, and in doing this he tells us what the facts and the normal usages really and trully are. But, do his own theory and his own analyses of particular issues involve linguistic innovations of their own for some deep purpose? Apparently not:

> What right do I have to think that [my hypothesis] is correct and the others are delusive? In answer to this question perhaps the best thing that I can say it that the position has "clicked" for me, that I *see* that it is correct, if not in every detail, then at least in substance. Against this it will undoubtedly be objected that each of the other four hypotheses has seemed right to many philosophers, so that I am really no better off than they are and am only another brother metaphysician. To this I can only say that each of the four hypotheses has attracted philosophers, as several of them once attracted me, because they satisfied unconscious needs, needs which blind one to the recalcitrant fact that these hypotheses fail to explain the chronic condition of philosophical differences of opinion. The hypothesis I am going to formulate meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact, and to put the matter subjectively, has "clicked" intellectually for me. [P. 58.]

Apparently, there are clicks and clicks. To say that the theory meets the *intellectual* need of facing facts is to call it a scientific

description, according to the theory itself. It is hard, of course, to find out about anybody's deep purposes, and it may be that no one will get so metaphysically attached to the idea of linguistic innovation for unconscious purposes as to resist counter-evidence. Most readers, however, will probably feel, as John Wisdom does in the Foreword, that Professor Lazerowitz is writing philosophy and that the theory ought to apply to itself. Even so, there is no harm done, and it is hard to bring charges of inconsistency. After all, if the theory is right, metaphysicians always speak in the empirical mode, and it must appear to the metaphysician, at least initially, that he is simply telling us what really and truly is the case. Perhaps some theory of types ought to require that metaphysics must talk as a deep theory about reality and that meta-metaphysics must talk as a deep theory about metaphysics. At any rate, there is something to be said for this "straightforward" way of writing, at least some of the time. Certainly, many readers will find it less confusing, if less rich, and a better introduction to the English style than, say, John Wisdom's extremely sophisticated essays, always intricate examples of the kind of thing they discuss.

In sum, this book should do a useful service. It contains a very suggestive thesis and a lot of piecemeal bits of good analysis. For those who want them, of course, it is good to have Professor Lazerowitz' essays reprinted under one cover, but as it stands the book is only a little more than a collection of essays. It would have been much more valuable had it been reworked and consolidated. Professor Lazerowitz can still carry out his own program elsewhere, of course, and it is very much to be hoped that either he or someone else will do us this good service.

R. N. WISAN

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NOTES AND NEWS

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
EASTERN DIVISION

The fifty-third annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association will be held at the University of Pennsylvania, December 27–29, 1956. A detailed announcement concerning the program and accommodations, together with abstracts of non-symposium papers, will be sent to members early in November. Persons who are not members of the Eastern Division and who wish information should write to Professor John

S. Adams, Box 23, College Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

Arrangements have been made with this JOURNAL to publish the symposium papers for the program so that they may be available in advance of the meetings. The papers will appear in two or three successive double numbers of this JOURNAL beginning with the issue for October 25, so that regular subscribers will receive them as a matter of course.

Non-subscribers who wish to receive sets of these issues before the meetings may order them from The Journal of Philosophy, 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. The charge is $1.00 per set and should be remitted with the order. Please make checks payable to the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.

PACIFIC DIVISION

The thirtieth Annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association will be held at the Associated Colleges of Claremont, California, December 27–29, 1956. Members who desire to appear on the program are requested to submit their papers in duplicate to the Secretary of the Pacific Division, Professor Barnett Savery, Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. In order to be considered, papers must be received not later than November 3.

The program of the meetings will be issued about the end of the first week of December. All inquiries concerning reservations and arrangements should be addressed to Professor Frederick Sontag, Pomona College, Claremont, California. Reservations should be made before December 15.

Professor Errol E. Harris, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, is Visiting Professor at Connecticut College for the year 1956–57. He is also teaching at Yale University.

Paul Henri, S. J., of the Institut Catholique of Paris, will deliver a series of three lectures on Plotinus at Columbia University, Philosophy Hall, October 23, 24, and 25, at eight o'clock in the evening.

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